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Robust Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games
Romain Brenguier⋆
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Abstract We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in mul-
tiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A (k, t)-robust
equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size k can im-
prove the payoff of one its member by deviating, and no coalition of size
t can decrease the payoff of other players. While deciding whether there
exists such equilibria is undecidable in general, we suggest algorithms
for two meaningful restrictions on the complexity of strategies. The first
restriction concerns memory. We show that we can reduce the problem
of the existence of a memoryless robust equilibrium to a formula in the
(existential) theory of reals. The second restriction concerns randomi-
sation. We suggest a general transformation from multiplayer games to
two-player games such that pure equilibria in the first game correspond
to winning strategies in the second one. Thanks to this transformation,
we show that the existence of robust equilibria can be decided in poly-
nomial space, and that the decision problem is PSPACE-complete.
1 Introduction
Games are intensively used in computer science to model interactions in com-
puterised systems. Two player antagonistic games have been successfully used
for the synthesis of reactive systems. In this context, the opponent acts as a
hostile environment, and winning strategies provide controllers that ensure cor-
rectness of the system under any scenario. In order to model complex systems in
which several rational entities interact, multiplayer concurrent games come into
the picture. Correctness of the strategies can be specified with different solution
concepts, which describe formally what is a “good” strategy. In game theory,
the fundamental solution concept is Nash equilibrium [15], where no player can
benefit from changing its own strategy. The notion of robust equilibria refines
Nash equilibria in two ways: 1. a robust equilibrium is resilient, i.e. when a
“small” coalition of player changes its strategy, it can not improve the payoff of
one of its participants; 2. it is immune, i.e. when a “small” coalition changes its
strategy, it will not lower the payoff of the non-deviating players. The size of
what is considered a small coalition is determined by a bound k for resilience and
another t for immunity. When a strategy is both k-resilient and t-immune, it is
called a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. We also generalise this concept to the notion
(k, t, r)-robust equilibrium, where if t players are deviating, the others should
not have their payoff decrease by more than r.
⋆ Work supported by ERC Starting Grant inVEST (279499) and EPSRC grant
EP/M023656/1.
Example In the design of network protocols, when many users are interacting,
coalitions can easily be formed and resilient strategies are necessary to avoid
deviation. It is also likely that some clients are faulty and begin to behave un-
expectedly, hence the need for immune strategies.
As an example, consider a program for a server that distributes files, of
which a part is represented in Figure 1. The functions listen and send files
will be run in parallel by the server. Some choices in the design of these functions
have not been fixed yet and we wish to analyse the robustness of the different
alternatives.
This program uses a table clients to keep track of the clients which are
connected. Notice that the table has fixed size 2, which means that if 3 clients
try to connect at the same time, one of them may have its socket overwritten in
the table and will have to reconnect later to get the file. We want to know what
strategy the clients should use and how robust the protocol will be: can clients
exploit the protocol to get their files faster than the normal usage, and how will
the performance of the over clients be affected.
We consider different strategies to chose between the possible alternatives in
the program of Figure 1. The strategy that chooses alternatives 1 and 3 does not
give 1-resilient equilibria even for just two clients: Player 1 can always reconnect
just after its socket was closed, so that clients[0] points to player 1 once again.
In this way, he can deviate from any profile to never have to wait for the file.
Since the second player could do the same thing, no profile is 1-resilient (nor
1-immune). For the same reasons, the strategy 2, 3 does not give 1-resilient equi-
libria. The strategy 1, 4 does not give 1-resilient equilibria either, since player 1
can launch a new connection after player 2 to overwrite clients[1].
The strategy 2, 4 is the one that may give the best solution. We modelled the
interaction of this program as a concurrent game for a situation with 2 potential
clients in Figure 2. The labels represent the content of the table clients: 0
means no connection, 1 means connected with player 1 and 2 connected with
player 2; and the instruction that the function send files is executing. Because
the game is quite big we represent only the part where player 1 connects before
player 2 and the rest of the graph can be deduced by symmetry. The actions of
the players are either to wait (action w) or to connect (action ch or ct). Symbol
∗ means any possible action. Note that in the case both player try to connect at
the same time we simulate a matching penny game in order to determine which
one will be treated first, this is the reason why we have two different possible
actions to connect (ch for “head” and ct for “tail”). Clients have a positive
reward when we send them the file they requested, this corresponds for Player i
to states labelled with send(i).
If both clients try to connect in the same slot, we use a matching penny game
to decide which request was the first to arrive. For a general method to transform
a game with continuous time into a concurrent game, see [6, Chapter 6].
Related works and comparison with Nash equilibria and secure equilibria Other
solution concepts have been proposed as concepts for synthesis of distributed sys-
tems, in particular Nash equilibrium [18,19,4], subgame perfect equilibria [17,10],
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clients = new socket[2];
void listen() {
while(true) {
Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
if(clients[0].isConnected())
//// Two possible alternatives:
| 1) clients[1] = socket;
| 2) if(socket.remoteSocketAddress()
!= clients[0].remoteSocketAddress())
| clients[1] = socket;
else
clients[0] = socket;
} }
void send_files() {
while(true) {
if(clients[0].isConnected()) {
send(clients[0]);
clients[0].close();
}
//// Two possible alternatives :
| 3) else if(clients[1].isConnected()) {
| 4) if(clients[1].isConnected()) {
send(clients[1]);
clients[1].close();
} } }
Figure 1: Example of a server program.
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Figure 2: Example of a concurrent game
generated from the program of Figure 1.
and secure equilibria [12]. A subgame perfect equilibria is a particular kind of
Nash equilibria, where at any point in the game, if we forget the history the
players are still playing a Nash equilibrium. In a secure equilibria, we ask that
no player can benefit or keep the same reward while reducing the payoff of other
players by changing its own strategy. However these concepts present two weak-
nesses: 1. There is no guarantee when two (or more) users deviate together. It
can happen on a network that the same person controls several devices (a laptop
and a phone for instance) and can then coordinate there behaviour. In that case,
the devices would be considered as different agents and Nash equilibria offers
no guarantee. 2. When a deviation occurs, the strategies of the equilibrium can
punish the deviating user without any regard for payoffs of the others. This can
result in a situation where, because of a faulty device, the protocol is totally
blocked. By comparison, finding resilient equilibria with k greater than 1, en-
sures that clients have no interest in forming coalitions (up to size k), and finding
immune equilibria with t greater than 0 ensures that other clients will not suffer
from some agents (up to t) behaving differently from what was expected.
Note that the concept of robust equilibria for games with LTL objectives is
expressible in logics such as strategy logic [13] or ATL∗ [2]. However, satisfiability
in these logic is difficult: it is 2EXPTIME-complete for ATL∗ and undecidable for
strategy logic in general (2EXPTIME-complete fragments exist [14]). Moreover,
these logics cannot express equilibria in quantitative games such as mean-payoff.
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Contributions In this paper, we study the problem of finding robust equilibria in
multiplayer concurrent games. This problem is undecidable in general (see Sec-
tion 2.3). In Section 3, we show that if we look for stationary (but randomised)
strategies, then the problem can be decided using the theory of reals. We then
turn to the case of pure (but memoryful) strategies. In Section 4, we describe a
generic transformation from multiplayer games to two-player games. The result-
ing two-player game is called the deviator game. We show that pure equilibria
in the original game correspond to winning strategies in the second one. In Sec-
tion 5, we study quantitative games with mean-payoff objectives. We show that
the game obtained by our transformation is equivalent to a multidimensional
mean-payoff game. We then show that this can be reduced to a value problem
with linear constraints in multidimensional mean-payoff games. We show that
this can be solved in polynomial space, by making use of the structure of the
deviator game. In Section 7, we prove the matching lower bound which shows the
robustness problem is PSPACE-complete. Due to space constraints, most proofs
have been omitted from this paper; they can be found in the appendix.
2 Definitions
2.1 Weighted concurrent games
We study concurrent game as defined in [2] with the addition of weights on the
edges.
Concurrent games. A weighted concurrent game (or simply a game) G is
a tuple 〈Stat, s0, Agt,Act,Tab, (wA)A∈Agt〉, where: Stat is a finite set of states
and s0 ∈ Stat is the initial state; Agt is a finite set of players ; Act is a finite
set of actions ; a tuple (aA)A∈Agt containing one action aA for each player A is
called a move; Tab : Stat×ActAgt → Stat is the transition function, it associates
with a given state and a given move, the resulting state; for each player A ∈ Agt,
wA : Stat 7→ Z is a weight function which assigns to each agent an integer weight.
In a game G, whenever we arrive at a state s, the players simultaneously
select an action. This results in a move aAgt; the next state of the game is then
Tab(s, aAgt). This process starts from s0 and is repeated to form an infinite
sequence of states.
An example of a game is given in Figure 2. It models the interaction of two
clients A1 and A2 with the program presented in the introduction. The weight
functions for this game are given by wA1 = 1 in states labelled by send(1) and
wA1 = 0 elsewhere, similarly wA2 = 1 in states labelled by send(2).
History and plays. A history of the game G is a finite sequence of states
and moves ending with a state, i.e. an word in (Stat · ActAgt)∗ · Stat. We write
hi the i-th state of h, starting from 0, and movei(h) its i-th move, thus h =
h0 ·move0(h) ·h1 · · ·moven−1(h) ·hn. The length |h| of such a history is n+1. We
write last(h) the last state of h, i.e. h|h|−1. A play ρ is an infinite sequence of
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states and moves, i.e. an element of (Stat ·ActAgt)ω. We write ρ≤n for the prefix
of ρ of length n+ 1, i.e. the history ρ0 ·move0(ρ) · · ·moven−1(ρ) · ρn.
The mean-payoff of weight w along a play ρ is the average of the weights
along the play: MPw(ρ) = lim infn→∞
1
n
∑
0≤k≤n w(ρk). The payoff for agent
A ∈ Agt of a play ρ is the mean-payoff of the corresponding weight: payoffA(ρ) =
MPwA(ρ). Note that it only depends on the sequence of states, and not on the
sequence of moves. The payoff vector of the run ρ is the vector p ∈ RAgt such
that for all players A ∈ Agt, pA = payoffA(ρ); we simply write payoff(ρ) for this
vector.
Strategies. Let G be a game, and A ∈ Agt. A strategy for player A maps
histories to probability distributions over actions. Formally, a strategy is a func-
tion σA : (Stat · Act
Agt)∗ · Stat → D(Act), where D(Act) is the set of probability
distributions over Act. For an action a ∈ Act, we write σA(a | h) the proba-
bility assigned to a by the distribution σ(h). A coalition C ⊆ Agt is a set of
players, its size is the number of players it contains and we write it |C|. A strat-
egy σC = (σA)A∈C for a coalition C ⊆ Agt is a tuple of strategies, one for each
player in C. We write σ−C for a strategy of coalition Agt \ C. A strategy profile
is a strategy for Agt. We will write (σ−C , σ
′
C) for the strategy profile σ
′′
Agt such
that if A ∈ C then σ′′A = σ
′
A and otherwise σ
′′
A = σA. We write StratG(C) for the
set of strategies of coalition C. A strategy σA for player A is said deterministic
if it does not use randomisation: for all histories h there is an action a such that
σ(a | h) = 1. A strategy σA for player A is said stationary if it depends only on
the last state of the history: for all histories h, σA(h) = σA(last(h)).
Outcomes. Let C be a coalition, and σC a strategy for C. A history h is
compatible with the strategy σC if, for all k < |h| − 1, (movek(h))A = σA(h≤k)
for all A ∈ C, and Tab(hk,movek(h)) = hk+1. A play ρ is compatible with the
strategy σC if all its prefixes are. We write OutG(s, σC) for the set of plays in G
that are compatible with strategy σC of C and have initial state s, these paths
are called outcomes of σC from s. We simply write OutG(σC) when s = s0 and
OutG is the set of plays that are compatible with some strategy. Note that when
the coalition C is composed of all the players and the strategies are deterministic
the outcome is unique.
An objective Ω is a set of plays and a strategy σC is said winning for objective
Ω if all its outcomes belong to Ω.
Probability measure induced by a strategy profile. Given a strategy
profile σAgt, the conditional probability of aAgt given history h ∈ (Stat ·Act
Agt)∗ ·
Stat is σAgt(aAgt | h) =
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | h). The probabilities σAgt(aAgt | h)
induce a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra over (Stat · ActAgt)ω as
follows: the probability of a basic open set h · (Stat ·ActAgt)ω equals the product∏n
j=1 σAgt(h
Act
j,A | h≤j) if h0 = s0 and Tab(hj , h
Act
Agt,j) = hj+1 for all 1 ≤ j < n; in
all other cases, this probability is 0. By Carathodory’s extension theorem, this
extends to a unique probability measure assigning a probability to every Borel
subset of (Stat · ActAgt)ω , which we denote by PrσAgt . We denote by EσAgt the
5
expectation operator that corresponds to PrσAgt , that is EσAgt(f) =
∫
f dPrσAgt
for all Borel measurable functions f : (Stat ·ActAgt)ω 7→ R∪{±∞}. The expected
payoff for player A of a strategy profile σAgt is payoffA(σAgt) = E
σAgt(MPwA).
2.2 Equilibria notions
We now present the different solution concepts we will study. Solution concepts
are formal descriptions of “good” strategy profiles. The most famous of them is
Nash equilibrium [15], in which no single player can improve the outcome for
its own preference relation, by only changing its strategy. This notion can be
generalised to consider coalitions of players, it is then called a resilient strat-
egy profile. Nash equilibria correspond to the special case of 1-resilient strategy
profiles.
Resilience [3]. Given a coalition C ⊆ Agt, a strategy profile σAgt is C-resilient
if for all agents A in C, A cannot improve her payoff even if all agents in C
change their strategies, i.e. σAgt is said C-resilient when:
∀σ′C ∈ StratG(C). ∀A ∈ C. payoffA(σ−C , σ
′
C) ≤ payoffA(σAgt)
Given an integer k, we say that a strategy profile is k-resilient if it is C-resilient
for every coalition C of size k.
Immunity [1]. Immune strategies ensure that players not deviating are not too
much affected by deviation. Formally, a strategy profile σAgt is (C, r)-immune if
all players not in C, are not worse off by more than r if players in C deviates,
i.e. when:
∀σ′C ∈ StratG(C). ∀A ∈ Agt \ C. payoffA(σAgt)− r ≤ payoffA(σ−C , σ
′
C)
Given an integer t, a strategy profile is said (t, r)-immune if it is (C, r)-immune
for every coalition C of size t. Note that t-immunity as defined in [1] corresponds
to (t, 0)-immunity.
Robust Equilibrium [1]. Combining resilience and immunity, gives the notion
of robust equilibrium: a strategy profile is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium if it is both
k-resilient and (t, r)-immune.
The aim of this article is to characterise robust equilibria in order to con-
struct the corresponding strategies, and precisely describe the complexity of the
following decision problem for mean-payoff games.
Robustness Decision Problem. Given a game G, integers k, t, rational r
does there exist a profile σAgt, that is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium σAgt in G?
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2.3 Undecidability
We show that allowing strategies that can use both randomisation and memory
leads to undecidability. The problem of existence of Nash equilibria has been
shown to be undecidable if we put constraints on the payoffs in [19]. The proof
was improved to involve only 3 players and no constraint on the payoffs for
games with terminal-reward (the weights are non-zero only in terminal vertices
of the game) [5]. This corresponds to the particular case where k = 1, t = 0
for the robustness decision problem. Therefore, the following is a corollary of [5,
Thm.13].
Theorem 1. For randomised strategies, the robustness problem is undecidable
even for 3 players, k = 1 and t = 0.
To recover decidability, two restrictions are natural. In the next section, we
will show that for randomised strategies with no memory, the problem is decid-
able. The rest of the article is devoted to the second restriction, which concerns
pure strategies.
3 Stationary strategies
We use the existential theory of reals, which is the set of all existential first-order
sentences that hold in the ordered field R := (R,+, ·, 0, 1,≤), to show that the
robustness decision problem is decidable. The associated decision problem is in
the PSPACE complexity class [11]. However, since the system of equation we
produce is of exponential size, we can only show that the robustness problem for
(randomised) stationary strategies is in EXPSPACE.
Encoding of strategies We encode a stationary strategy σA, by a tuple of real
variables (ςs,a)s∈Stat,a∈Act ∈ R
Stat×Act such that ςs,a = σA(a | s) for all s ∈ Stat
and a ∈ Act. We then write a formula saying that these variables describe a
correct stationary strategy. The following lemma is a direct consequence of the
definition of strategy.
Lemma 1. Let (ςs,a)s∈S,a∈Act be a tuple of real variables. The mapping σ : s, a 7→
ςs is a stationary strategy if, and only if, ς is a solution of the following equation:
µ(ς) :=
∧
s∈S
(∑
a∈Act ςs,a = 1 ∧
∧
a∈Act ςs,a ≥ 0
)
Payoff of a profile We now give an equation which links a stationary strat-
egy profile and its payoff. For this we notice that a concurrent game where the
stationary strategy profile has been fixed corresponds to a Markov reward pro-
cess [16]. We recall that a Markov reward process is a tuple 〈S, P, r〉 where: 1. S
is a set of states; 2. P ∈ RS×S is a transition matrix; 3. r : S 7→ R is a reward
function. The expected value is then the expectation of the average reward of
r. This value for each state is described by a system of equations in [16, Theo-
rem 8.2.6]. We reuse these equations to obtain Thm. 2. Details of the proof are
in the appendix.
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Theorem 2. Let σAgt be a stationary strategy profile. The expectation for MPw
of σAgt from s is the component γs of the solution γ of the equation:
ψ(γ, σAgt, w) := ∃β ∈ R
S .
∧
s∈S
(
γs =
∑
aAgt∈ActAgt
γTab(s,aAgt) ·
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s)
)
∧
∧
s∈S
(
γs + βs = w(s) +
∑
aAgt∈ActAgt
βTab(s,aAgt) ·
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s)
)
Optimal payoff of a deviation We now want to keep the strategy profile
fixed but also allow deviations and investigate what is the maximum payoff
that a coalition can achieve by deviating. The system that is obtained is then a
Markov decision processes. We recall that a Markov decision process (MDP) is a
tuple 〈S,A, P, r〉, where: 1. S is a the non-empty, countable set of states. 2. A is
a set of actions. 3. P : S×A×S 7→ [0, 1] is the transition relation. It is such that
for each s ∈ S \ S∃ and a ∈ A,
∑
(s,a,s′)∈S×A×S P (s, a, s
′) = 1. 4. r : S 7→ R is
the reward function. The optimal value is then maximal expectation that can be
obtained by a strategy. The optimal values in such systems can be described by
a linear program [16, Section 9.3]. We reuse this linear program to characterise
optimal values against a strategy profile C. Details of the proof can be found in
the appendix.
Theorem 3. Let σAgt be a stationary strategy profile, C a coalition, s a state
and w a weight function. The highest expectation Agt \C can obtain for w in G
from s: supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPw, s), is the smallest γs component of a solution of
the system of inequation:
φ(γ, σC , w) :=
∧
a−C∈ActAgt\C
∧
s∈S γs ≥
∑
aC∈ActC
γδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C σA(aA | s)
∧
∧
a−C∈ActAgt\C
∧
s∈S γs ≥ w(s)−βs+
∑
aC∈ActC
(
βδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C σA(aA | s)
)
Expressing the existence of robust equilibria Putting these results to-
gether, we obtain the results. Intuitively, ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) ensures that γ corre-
spond to the payoff for σAgt of A, and φ(γ
′, σ−C , wA) makes γ
′ correspond to
the payoff for a deviation of σC .
Theorem 4. Let σAgt be a strategy profile.
– It is C-resilient if, and only if, it satisfies the formula:
ρ(C, σAgt) :=
∧
A∈C ∃γ, γ
′. (ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) ∧ φ(γ
′, σ−C , wA) ∧ (γ
′ ≤ γ))
– It is C, r-immune if, and only if, it satisfies equation:
ι(C, σAgt) :=
∧
A 6∈C ∃γ, γ
′. (ψ(γ, σAgt, A) ∧ φ(γ
′, σ−C ,−wA) ∧ γ − r ≤ −γ
′)
– There is a robust equilibria if, and only if, the following equation is satisfiable:
∃ς ∈ RAgt×Stat×Act. µ(ς) ∧
∧
C⊆Agt||C|≤k ρ(C, ς) ∧
∧
C⊆Agt||C|≤t ι(C, ς)
Theorem 5. The robustness problem is in EXPSPACE for stationary strategies.
Proof. By Thm. 4, the existence of a robust equilibria is equivalent to the sat-
isfiability of a formula in the existential theory of reals. This formula can be of
exponential size with respect to k and t, since a conjunction over coalitions of
these size is considered. The best known upper bound for the theory of the reals
in PSPACE [11], which gives the EXPSPACE upper bound for our problem.
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4 Deviator Game
We now turn to the case of non-randomised strategies. In order to obtain simple
algorithms for the robustness problem, we use a correspondence with zero-sum
two-players game. Winning strategies has been well studied in computer science
and we can make use of existing algorithms. We present the deviator game, which
is a transformation of multiplayer game into a turn-based zero-sum game, such
that there are strong links between robust equilibria in the first one and winning
strategies in the second one. This is formalised in Thm. 6. Note that the proofs
of this section are independent from the type of objectives we consider, and the
result could be extended beyond mean-payoff objectives.
Deviator. The basic notion we use to solve the robustness problem is that of
deviators. It identifies players that cause the current deviation from the expected
outcome. A deviator from move aAgt to a
′
Agt is a player D ∈ Agt such that aD 6=
a′D. We write this set of deviators: Dev(aAgt, a
′
Agt) = {A ∈ Agt | aA 6= a
′
A}. We
extend the definition to histories and strategies by taking the union of deviator
sets, formally Dev(h, σAgt) =
⋃
0≤i<|h|Dev(movei(h), σAgt(h≤i)). It naturally ex-
tends to plays: if ρ is a play, then Dev(ρ, σAgt) =
⋃
i∈N Dev(movei(ρ), σAgt(ρ≤i)).
Intuitively, given an play ρ and a strategy profile σAgt, deviators represent
the agents that need to change their strategies from σAgt in order to obtain the
play ρ. The intuition is formalised in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let ρ be a play, σAgt a strategy profile and C ⊆ Agt a coalition.
Coalition C contains Dev(ρ, σAgt) if, and only if, there exists σ
′
C such that ρ ∈
OutG(ρ0, σ
′
C , σ−C).
4.1 Deviator Game
We now use the notion of deviators to draw a link between multiplayer games
and a two-player game that we will use to solve the robustness problem. Given
a concurrent game structure G, we define the deviator game D(G) between two
players called Eve and Adam. Intuitively Eve needs to play according to an equi-
librium, while Adam tries to find a deviation of a coalition which will profit one
of its player or harm one of the others. The states are in Stat′ = Stat × 2Agt;
the second component records the deviators of the current history. The game
starts in (s0,∅) and then proceeds as follows: from a state (s,D), Eve chooses
an action profile aAgt and Adam chooses another one a
′
Agt, then the next state is
(Tab(s, a′Agt), D ∪ Dev(aAgt, a
′
Agt)). In other words, Adam chooses the move that
will apply, but this can be at the price of adding players to the D component
when he does not follow the choice of Eve. The weights of a state (s,D) in this
game are the same than that of s in G. The construction of the deviator arena
is illustrated in Figure 3.
We now define some transformations between the different objects used in
games G and D(G). We define projections πStat, πDev and πAct from Stat
′ to Stat,
from Stat′ to 2Agt and from ActAgt×ActAgt to ActAgt respectively. They are given
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Figure 3: Part of the deviator game construction for the game of Figure 2. Labels
on the edges correspond to the action of Eve and the action of Adam. Labels inside
the states are the state of the original game and the deviator component.
by πStat(s,D) = s, πDev(s,D) = D and πAct(aAgt, a
′
Agt) = a
′
Agt. We extend these
projections to plays in a natural way, letting πOut(ρ) = πStat(ρ0) ·πAct(move0(ρ)) ·
πStat(ρ1) · πAct(move1(ρ)) · · · and πDev(ρ) = πDev(ρ0) · πDev(ρ1) · · · . Note that for
any play ρ, and any index i, πDev(ρi) ⊆ πDev(ρi+1), therefore πDev(ρ) seen as a
sequence of sets of coalitions is increasing and bounded by Agt, its limit δ(ρ) =
∪i∈NπDev(ρi) is well defined. Moreover to a strategy profile σAgt in G, we can
naturally associate a strategy κ(σAgt) for Eve in D(G) such that for all histories
h by κ(σAgt)(h) = σAgt(πOut(h)).
The following lemma states the correctness of the construction of the deviator
game, in the sense that it records the set of deviators in the strategy profile
suggested by Adam with respect to the strategy profile suggested by Eve.
Lemma 3. Let G be a game and σAgt be a strategy profile and σ∃ = κ(σAgt) the
associated strategy in the deviator game.
1. If ρ ∈ OutD(G)(σ∃), then Dev(πOut(ρ), σAgt) = δ(ρ).
2. If ρ ∈ OutG and ρ
′ = ((ρi,Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt)) · (σAgt(ρ≤i),movei(ρ)))i∈N then
ρ′ ∈ OutD(G)(σ∃)
4.2 Objectives of the deviator game
We now show how to transform equilibria notions into objectives of the deviator
game. These objectives are defined so that winning strategies correspond to
equilibria of the original game. First, we define an objective Ω(C,A,G) in the
following lemma, such that a profile which ensures some quantitative goal G ⊆ R
in G against coalition C corresponds to a winning strategy in the deviator game.
Lemma 4. Let C ⊆ Agt be a coalition, σAgt be a strategy profile, G ⊆ R and A a
player. We have that for all strategies σ′C for coalition C, payoffA(σ−C , σ
′
C) ∈ G
if, and only if, κ(σAgt) is winning in D(G) for objective Ω(C,A,G) = {ρ | δ(ρ) ⊆
C ⇒ payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ∈ G}.
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This lemma makes it easy to characterise the different kinds of equilibria,
using objectives in D(G). For instance, we define a resilience objective where if
there are more than k deviators then Eve has nothing to do; if there are exactly
k deviators then she has to show that none of them gain anything; and if there
are less than k then no player at all should gain anything. This is because if
a new player joins the coalition, its size remains smaller or equal to k. Similar
characterisations for immune and robust equilibria lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Let G be a concurrent game, σAgt a strategy profile in G, p =
payoff(Out(σAgt)) the payoff profile of σAgt, k and t integers, and r a rational.
– The strategy profile σAgt is k-resilient if, and only if, strategy κ(σAgt) is win-
ning in D(G) for the resilience objective Re(k, p) where Re(k, p) is defined
by: Re(k, p) = {ρ | |δ(ρ)| > k} ∪{ρ | |δ(ρ)| = k∧∀A ∈ δ(ρ). payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ≤
p(A)} ∪{ρ | |δ(ρ)| < k ∧ ∀A ∈ Agt. payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ≤ p(A)}
– The strategy profile σAgt is (t, r)-immune if, and only if, strategy κ(σAgt) is
winning for the immunity objective I(t, r, p) I(t, r, p) is defined by: I(t, r, p) =
{ρ | |δ(ρ)| > t} ∪ {ρ | ∀A ∈ Agt \ δ(ρ). p(A)− r ≤ payoffA(πStat(ρ))}
– The strategy profile σAgt is a (k, t, r)-robust profile in G if, and only if, κ(σAgt)
is winning for the robustness objective R(k, t, r, p) = Re(k, p) ∩ I(t, r, p).
5 Reduction to multidimensional mean-payoff objectives
We first show that the deviator game reduces the robustness problem to a win-
ning strategy problem in multidimensional mean-payoff games. We then solve
this by requests to the polyhedron value problem of [9].
5.1 Multidimensional objectives
Multidimensional mean-payoff objective. Let G be a two-player game,
v : Stat 7→ Zd a multidimensional weight functions and I, J ⊆ J1, dK1 a parti-
tion of J1, dK (i.e. I ⊎ J = J1, dK). We say that Eve ensures threshold u ∈ Rd
if she has a strategy σ∃ such that all outcomes ρ of σ∃ are such that for all
i ∈ I, MPvi(ρ) ≥ ui and for all j ∈ J , MPvj (ρ) ≥ uj, where MPvj (ρ) =
lim supn→∞
1
n
∑
0≤k≤n vj(ρk). That is, for all dimensions i ∈ I, the limit in-
ferior of the average of vi is greater than ui and for all dimensions j ∈ J the
limit superior of vj is greater than uj .
We consider two decision problems on these games: 1. The value problem,
asks given 〈G, v, I, J〉 a game with multidimensional mean-payoff objectives,
and u ∈ Rd, whether Eve can ensure u. 2. The polyhedron value problem, asks
given 〈G, v, I, J〉 a game with multidimensional mean-payoff objectives, and
(λ1, . . . , λn) a tuple of linear inequations, whether there exists a threshold u
which Eve can ensure and that satisfies the inequation λi for all i in J1, dK. We
assume that all linear inequations are given by a tuple (a1, . . . , ad, b) ∈ Q
d+1 and
1 We write Ji, jK for the set of integers {k ∈ Z | i ≤ k ≤ j}.
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that a point u ∈ Rd satisfies it when
∑
i∈J1,dK ai · ui ≥ b. The value problem was
showed to be coNP-complete [20] while the polyhedron value problem is Σ2P-
complete [9]. Our goal is now to reduce our robustness problem to a polyhedron
value problem for some well chosen weights.
In our case, the number d of dimensions will be equal to 4 · |Agt|. We then
number players so that Agt = {A1, . . . , A|Agt|}. Let W = max{|wi(s)| | Ai ∈
Agt, s ∈ Stat} be the maximum constant occurring in the weights of the game,
notice that for all players Ai and play ρ, −W − 1 < MPi(ρ) ≤ W . We fix
parameters k, t and define our weight function v : Stat 7→ Zd. Let i ∈ J1, |Agt|K,
the weights are given for (s,D) ∈ Stat× 2Agt by:
1. if |D| ≤ t and Ai 6∈ D, then vi(s,D) = wAi(s);
2. if |D| > t or Ai ∈ D, then vi(s,D) = W ;
3. if |D| < k, then for all Ai ∈ Agt, v|Agt|+i(s,D) = −wAi(s);
4. if |D| = k and Ai ∈ D, then v|Agt|+i(s,D) = −wAi(s);
5. if |D| > k or Ai 6∈ D and |D| = k, then v|Agt|+i(s,D) =W .
6. if D = ∅ then v2·|Agt|+i(s,D) = wAi(s) = −v3·|Agt|+i(s,D);
7. if D 6= ∅ then v2·|Agt|+i(s,D) = W = v3·|Agt|+i(s,D);
We take I = J1, |Agt|K∪ J2 · |Agt|+1, 3 · |Agt|K and J = J|Agt|+1, 2 · |Agt|K∪ J3 ·
|Agt|+ 1, 4 · |Agt|K. Intuitively, the components J1, |Agt|K are used for immunity,
the components J|Agt|+ 1, 2 · |Agt|K are used for resilience and components J2 ·
|Agt|+ 1, 4 · |Agt|K are used to constrain the payoff in case of no deviation.
5.2 Correctness of the objectives for robustness
Let G be a concurrent game, ρ a play of D(G) and p ∈ RAgt a payoff vector. The
following lemma links the weights we chose and our solution concepts.
Lemma 5. Let ρ be a play, σAgt a strategy profile and p = payoff(σAgt).
– ρ satisfies objective δ(ρ) = ∅⇒ MPAi(ρ) = pi if, and only if,MP2·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥
p(Ai) and MP3·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
– If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt) then ρ satisfies objective Re(k, p) if, and only
if, for all agents Ai, MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
– If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt), then ρ satisfies objective I(t, r, p) if, and only
if, for all agents Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai)− r.
– If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt) with payoff(σAgt) = p, then play ρ satisfies
objective R(k, t, r, p) if, and only if, for all agents Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai) − r
and MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
Putting together this lemma and the correspondence between the deviator
game and robust equilibria of Thm. 6 we obtain the following proposition.
Lemma 6. Let G be a concurrent game with mean-payoff objectives. There is a
(k, t, r)-robust equilibrium in G if, and only if, for the multidimensional mean-
payoff objective given by v, I = J1, |Agt|K ∪ J2 · |Agt| + 1, 3 · |Agt|K and J =
J|Agt|+ 1, 2 · |Agt|K ∪ J3 · |Agt|+ 1, 4 · |Agt|K, there is a payoff vector p such that
Eve can ensure threshold u in D(G), where for all i ∈ J1, |Agt|K, ui = p(Ai)− r,
u|Agt|+i = −p(Ai), u2·|Agt|+i = p(Ai), and u3·|Agt|+i = −p(Ai).
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5.3 Formulation of the robustness problem as a polyhedron value
problem
From the previous lemma, we can deduce an algorithm which works by querying
the polyhedron value problem. Given a game G and parameters k, t, r, we ask
whether there exists a payoff u that Eve can ensured in the game D(G) with
multidimensional mean-payoff objective given by v, I, J , and such that for all
i ∈ J1, |Agt|K, ui + r = −u|Agt|+i = u2·|Agt|+i = −u3·|Agt|+i. As we will show in
Thm. 7 thanks to Lem. 6, the answer to this question is yes if, and only if, there
is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium. From the point of view of complexity, however,
the deviator game on which we perform the query can be of exponential size
compared to the original game. To describe more precisely the complexity of the
problem, we remark by applying the bound of [8, Thm. 22], that given a query,
we can find solutions which have a small representation.
Lemma 7. If there is a solution to the polyhedron value problem in D(G) then
there is one whose encoding is of polynomial size with respect to G and the
polyhedron given as input.
We can therefore enumerate all possible solutions in polynomial space. To
obtain an polynomial space algorithm, we must be able to check one solution
in polynomial space as well. This account to show that queries for the value
problem in the deviator game can be done in space polynomial with respect
to the original game. This is the goal of the next section, and it is done by
considering small parts of the deviator game called fixed coalition games.
6 Fixed coalition game
Although the deviator game may be of exponential size, it presents a particu-
lar structure. As the set of deviators only increases during any run, the game
can be seen as the product of the original game with a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). The nodes of this DAG correspond to possible sets of deviators, it is of
exponential size but polynomial degree and depth. We exploit this structure to
obtain a polynomial space algorithm for the value problem and thus also for the
polyhedron value problem and the robustness problem. The idea is to compute
winning states in one component at a time, and to recursively call the proce-
dure for states that are successors of the current component. We will therefore
consider one different game for each component.
We now present the details of the procedure. For a fixed set of deviator D,
the possible successors of states of the component Stat×D are the states in:
Succ(D) = {TabD((s,D), (mAgt,m
′
Agt)) | s ∈ Stat,mAgt,m
′
Agt ∈ Mov(s)} \ Stat×
D}. Note that the size of Succ(D) is bounded by |Stat| × |Tab|, hence it is
polynomial. Let u be a payoff threshold, we want to know whether Eve can
ensure u in D(G), for the multi-dimensional objective defined in Section 5.1. A
winning path ρ from a state in Stat×D is either: 1) such that δ(ρ) = D; 2) or
it reaches a state in Succ(D) and follow a winning path from there. Assume we
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have computed all the states in Succ(D) that are winning. We can stop the game
as soon as Succ(D) is reached, and declare Eve the winner if the state that is
reached is a winning state of D(G). This process can be seen as a game F(D, u),
called the fixed coalition game.
In this game the states are those of (Stat×D)∪Succ(D); transitions are the
same than in D(G) on the states of Stat × D and the states of Succ(D) have
only self loops. The winning condition is identical to R(k, t, p) for the plays that
never leave (Stat ×D); and for a play that reach some (s′, D′) ∈ Succ(D), it is
considered winning Eve has a winning strategy from (s′, D′) in D(G) and losing
otherwise.
In the fixed coalition game, we keep the weights previously defined for states
of Stat×D, and fix it for the states that are not in the same D component by
giving a high payoff on states that are winning and a low one on the losing ones.
Formally, we define a multidimensional weight function vf on F(D, u) by: 1. for
all s ∈ Stat, and all i ∈ J1, 4 · |Agt|K, vfi (s,D) = vi(s,D). 2. if (s,D
′) ∈ Succ(D)
and Eve can ensure u from (s,D′), then for all i ∈ J1, 4 · |Agt|K, vfi (s,D
′) = W .
3. if (s,D′) ∈ Succ(D) and Eve cannot ensure u from (s,D′), then for all i ∈
J1, 4 · |Agt|K, vfi (s,D
′) = −W − 1.
Lemma 8. Eve can ensure payoff u ∈ J−W,W Kd in D(G) from (s,D) if, and
only if, she can ensure u in the fixed coalition game F(D, p) from (s,D).
Using this correspondence, we deduce a polynomial space algorithm to check
that Eve can ensure a given value in the deviator game and thus a polynomial
space algorithm for the robustness problem.
Theorem 7. There is a polynomial space algorithm, that given a concurrent
game G, tells if there is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that there is a polynomial space algorithm to solve the
value problem in D(G). We consider a threshold u and a state (s,D). In the fixed
coalition game F(D, u), for each (s′, D′) ∈ Succ(D), we can compute whether it
is winning by recursive calls. Once the weights for all (s′, D′) ∈ Succ(D) have
been computed for F(D, u), we can solve the value problem in F(D, u). Thanks
to Lem. 8 the answer to value problem in this game is yes exactly when Eve can
ensure u from (s,D) in D(G). There is a coNP algorithm [20] to check the value
problem in a given game, and therefore there also is an algorithm which uses
polynomial space. The size of the stack of recursive calls is bounded by |Agt|, so
the global algorithm uses polynomial space.
We now use this to show that there is a polynomial space algorithm for the
polyhedron value problem in D(G). We showed in Lem. 7, that if the polyhedron
value problem has a solution then there is a threshold u of polynomial size that is
witness of this property. We can enumerate all the thresholds that satisfy the size
bound in polynomial space. We can then test that these thresholds satisfy the
given linear inequations, and that the algorithm for the value problem answers
yes on this input, in polynomial space thanks to the previous algorithm. If this
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is the case for one of the thresholds, then we answer yes for the polyhedron value
problem. The correctness of this procedure holds thanks to Lem. 7.
We now use this to show that there is a polynomial space algorithm for the
robustness problem. Given a game G and parameters (k, t, r), we define a tuple of
linear equations, for all i ∈ J1, |Agt|K, x2·|Agt|+i = xi+ r∧x2·|Agt|+i = −x|Agt|+i ∧
x2·|Agt|+i = −x3·|Agt|+i (each equation can be expressed by two inequations).
Thanks to Lem. 6, there is a payoff which satisfies these constraints and which
Eve can ensure in D(G) if, and only if, there is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium.
Then, querying the algorithm we described for the polyhedron value problem in
D(G) with our system of inequations, answers the robustness problem.
7 Hardness
In this section, we show a matching lower bound for the resilience problem. The
lower bound holds for weights that are 0 in every states except on some terminal
states where they can be 1. This is also called simple reachability objectives.
Theorem 8. The robustness problem is PSPACE-complete.
Note that we already proved PSPACE-membership in Thm. 7. We give the
construction and intuition of the reduction to show hardness and leave the proof
of correctness in the appendix. We encode QSAT formulas with n variable into
a game with 2 · n + 2 players, such that the formula is valid if, and only if,
there is n-resilient equilibria. We assume that we are given a formula of the form
φ = ∀x1.∃x2. ∀x3 ·∃xn. C1∧· · ·∧Ck, where each Ck is of the form ℓ1,k∨ℓ2,k∨ℓ3,k
and each ℓj,k is a literal (i.e. xm or ¬xm for some m). We define the game Gφ as
illustrated by an example in Figure 4. It has a player Am for each positive literal
xm, and a player Bm for each negative literal ¬xm. We add two extra players
Eve and Adam. Eve is making choices for the existential quantification and Adam
for the universal ones. When they chose a literal, the corresponding player can
either go to a sink state ⊥ or continue the game to the next quantification. Once
a literal has been chosen for all the variables, Eve needs to chose a literal for each
clause. The objective for Eve and the literal players is to reach ⊥. The objective
for Adam is to reach ⊤. We ask whether there is a (n+ 1)-resilient equilibrium.
To a history h = Adam1 ·X1 ·Eve2 ·X2 ·Adam3 · · ·Evem ·Xm with Xi ∈ {Ai, Bi},
we associate a valuation vh, such that vh(xi) = true if Xi = Bi and vh(xi) = false
if Xi = Ai. Intuitively, Eve has to find a valuation that makes the formula hold,
while Adam tries to falsify it.
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Adam
A1
B1
⊥ Eve
A2
B2
⊥ Adam
A3
B3
⊥ Eve
A4
B4
⊥ Eve
A1
A2
B3
⊤
⊤
Eve
B2
A3
A4
⊥
Figure 4: Encoding of a formula φ = ∀x1.∃x2. ∀x3. ∃x4. (x1 ∨x2 ∨¬x3)∧ (¬x2 ∨
x3 ∨ x4). The dashed edges represent the strategies in the equilibrium of the
players other than Eve.
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A Appendix for Section 3
We will recall how to compute values of Markov reward process (Lem. 9), make
explicit the correspondence with our problem on concurrent games (Lem. 10),
and then give equations describing the payoff of strategy profile.
Definition 1 (Markov reward processes). A Markov reward process is a
tuple 〈S, P, r〉 where: 1. S is a set of states; 2. P ∈ RS×S is a transition ma-
trix; 3. r : S 7→ R is a reward function. The probability of a history h ∈ S∗, is∏
0≤i<|h| P (hi, hi+1). The expected value of a Markov reward process is then de-
fined similarly to the expected value of a concurrent game, as the expectation of
MPr. The gain g ∈ R
S is a vector such that for each state s, g(s) is the expected
value from state s.
A.1 Proof of Thm. 2
We recall the result of [16] that we will use.
Theorem 9 ([16, Theorem 8.2.6]). Let 〈S, P, r〉 be Markov reward process.
We consider real variables of the form γs and βs for each s ∈ S. The gain is
uniquely characterised has the solution for γ of the equations (I −P ) · γ = 0 and
γ + (I − P ) · β = r where I is the identity matrix. This solution is such that γ
is equal to the gain2.
Thanks to this result, we can show that solutions of the following equation
are such that the mapping g : s 7→ γs corresponds to the gain:
∃β ∈ RS .
∧
s∈S
(
γs =
∑
s′∈S
Ps,s′ · γs′
)
∧
∧
s∈S
(
γs + βs = r(s) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,s′ · βs′
)
(1)
Lemma 9. In a Markov reward process 〈S, P, r〉, the solution γ of equation (1)
is such that for each state s, g(s) = γs where g is the gain function.
Proof. By using 9, g (the gain) and b (the bias) are the solutions for γ and β
of the equations of (I − P ) · γ = 0 and γ + (I − P ) · β = r. We can rewrite the
equation and since we are only interested in g we can abstract b:
∃β ∈ RS .
∧
s∈S
(
γs −
∑
s′∈S
Ps,s′ · γs′ = 0
)
∧
∧
s∈S
(
γs + βs −
∑
s′∈S
Ps,s′ · βs′ = r(s)
)
Which we then rewrite in the form of equation (1).
We now make explicit the correspondence with concurrent games. Let G
be a concurrent game, σAgt be a strategy profile and w a weight function. We
define the Markov reward process MRP(G, σAgt, w) = 〈Stat, P, w〉 where for all
(s, s′) ∈ Stat× Stat, P (s, s′) =
∑
aAgt|Tab(s,aAgt)=s′
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s).
2 β is equal to a quantity called the bias [16]
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Lemma 10. The expectation for MPw of the strategy profile σAgt is equal to the
expected value of the Markov reward process MRP(G, σAgt, w).
Proof. For proving the lemma, since the weight functions are the same, it is
enough to prove that the probability of an history in the Markov reward pro-
cess is the same as its probability in the concurrent game knowing that the
strategy profile σAgt. This is done by induction over the length of history h.
The case of length 1 is obvious. Now assume that h is a history that has same
probability p(h) in G knowing σAgt and in MRP(G, σAgt, A). The probability of
h · s in G knowing σAgt is the sum over actions profiles aAgt that lead from s
to s′ of the probability that the strategy profile σAgt chooses aAgt. This equals
p(h) ·
∑
aAgt|Tab(s,aAgt)=s′
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s), which is also equal to the probability
of a transition from s to s′ in MRP(G, σAgt, w) times p(h). Therefore the proba-
bility of h · s is equal in G knowing σAgt and in MRP(G, σAgt, w). This shows the
property.
Theorem 10. (Thm. 2 in the body of the paper) Let σAgt be a stationary strat-
egy profile. The expectation for MPw of σAgt from s is the component γs of the
solution γ of the equation:
ψ(γ, σAgt, w) := ∃β ∈ R
S .
∧
s∈S
(
γs =
∑
aAgt∈ActAgt
γTab(s,aAgt) ·
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s)
)
∧
∧
s∈S
(
γs + βs = w(s) +
∑
aAgt∈ActAgt
βTab(s,aAgt) ·
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | s)
)
Proof. Thanks to Lem. 10 the expected payoff is the same than the value of
MRP(G, σAgt, w). If we apply Lem. 9 to this Markov reward process, and replace
P by its expression given from σAgt, r by w, we obtain that its gain is given by
the equation:
∃β ∈ RS .
∧
s∈S

γs = ∑
s′∈S
∑
{aAgt|Tab(s,aAgt)=s′}
γs′ ·
∏
A∈Agt
σA(aA | s)


∧
∧
s∈S

γs + βs = w(s) + ∑
s′∈S
∑
{aAgt|Tab(s,aAgt)=s′}
βs′ ·
∏
A∈Agt
σA(aA | s)


We can then rewrite this, noticing that
∑
s′∈S
∑
{aAgt|Tab(s,aAgt)=s′}
f(s, s′, aAgt)
is the same as
∑
aAgt∈ActAgt
f(s,Tab(s, aAgt), aAgt) and we obtain the desired ex-
pression.
We will recall how to compute values of such processes (Lem. 11), draw the
link with our problem(Lem. 12), and then give equations linking the maximum
payoff a coalition can achieve with the given strategy profile (Thm. 11).
Definition 2 ([16,19]). A Markov decision process (MDP) is given by a tuple
〈S,A, P, r〉, where:
– S is a the non-empty, countable set of states.
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– A is a set of actions.
– P : S × A × S 7→ [0, 1] is the transition relation. It is such that for each
s ∈ S \ S∃ and a ∈ A,
∑
(s,a,s′)∈S×A×S P (s, a, s
′) = 1.
– r : S 7→ R is the reward function.
Given a policy σ : S → A, the probability of a history h ∈ S∗, is
∏
0≤i<|h|
∑
a∈A P (hi, σ(a |
hi), hi+1). The expected value E
σ(r) of a policy σ in a Markov reward process is
then defined similarly to the expected value of a concurrent game. The optimal
average reward is the maximum over the policies of the expected value: the op-
timal average reward of the MDP M from state s is written v(M, s) and equals
sup{σ : S→A}E
σ(MPr).
In [16, Section 9.3] it is shown that the optimal average reward of a MDP is
characterised by the following linear programs:
Minimise
∑
s∈S αs · γs where for all states s, αs > 0 and
∑
s∈S αs = 1
subject to:
∧
a∈Act
∧
s∈S
γs ≥
∑
s′∈S P (s, a, s
′) · γs′
∧
∧
a∈Act
∧
s∈S
γs ≥ r(s) +
∑
s′∈S P (s, a, s
′) · βs′ − βs (2)
Thanks to this linear program we can characterise optimal values against a
strategy profile C.
We reformulate the results of [16, Section 9.3] in the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Equation (2) is fulfilled by γ = (v(M, s))s∈S and if it is fulfilled by
some vector γ then γs ≥ v(M, s) for all states s.
Proof. That equation (2) if fulfilled by v(M, s) is obvious because it is the solu-
tion of the linear program. Assume now that some γ satisfies φ.
First notice that
∑
s∈S γs− v(M, s) ≥ 0 because γ is a solution of equation 2
and v(M, s) is the solution that minimises
∑
s∈S
γs
|S| (taking αs =
1
|S| for all
s ∈ S).
Towards a contradiction assume there is a state t, such that γt < v(M, t).
Given some ε with 0 < ε < 1, we let αt = 1−ε and αs =
ε
|S|−1 for each s 6= t. We
have that the constraints αs > 0 for all states s and
∑
s∈S αs = 1 are satisfied.
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Moreover:∑
αs · γs −
∑
αs · v(M, s)
=
∑
αs · (γs − v(M, s))
= αt · (γt − v(M, t)) +
∑
s6=t
αs · (γs − v(M, s))
= (γt − v(M, t))− ε · (γt − v(M, t)) +
∑
s6=t
ε ·
(γs − v(M, s))
|S| − 1
= (γt − v(M, t))− ε ·
((
1 +
1
|S| − 1
)
· (γt − v(M, t))−
∑
s∈S
γs − v(M, s)
|S| − 1
)
We write δ = γt−v(M,t)
(1+ 1|S|−1 )·(γt−v(M,t))−
∑
s∈S
γs−v(M,s)
|S|−1
, so that:
∑
αs · γs −
∑
αs · v(M, s) = (γt − v(M, t))
(
1−
ε
δ
)
We have that δ is greater than 0 because γt− v(M, t) < 0 by hypothesis, and
we showed that
∑
s∈S γs − v(M, s) ≥ 0 so δ > 0. We can then consider some ε
such that 0 < ε < min{1, δ}. We obtain that
∑
αs · γs −
∑
αs · v(M, s) < (γt − v(M, t))
Which means that
∑
αs ·γs <
∑
αs ·v(M, s) and contradicts that v(M, s) is the
solution of φ that minimises
∑
αs · γs.
We conclude that if vector γ satisfies equation (2) then γs ≥ v(M, s) for all
states s.
Given a coalition C, a stationary strategy profile σC for this coalition, and
a weight function w, we define a Markov decision process MDP(G, σC , w) which
represents possible executions of the game when strategies for the coalition C
have been fixed. We define MDP(G, σC , w) = 〈Stat,Act
Agt\C , P, w〉 where P is such
that the probability of a transition from s to s′ with action a−C is:
P (s, a−C , s
′) =
∑
aC |δ(s,aC ,a−C)=s′
∏
A∈C
σA(aA | h).
Given a strategy σ−C of the coalition Agt\C in G, we define its projection π(σ−C)
in G(σ−C): for all histories h, π(σ−C)(a−C | h) =
∏
A∈Agt\C σA(aA | h).
Lemma 12. The expectation for MPw of profile (σC , σ−C) in the game G is the
same as the expected value of the policy π(σ−C) in MDP(G, σC , w).
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Proof. Since the weights are given by the same function, it is enough to prove
that the probability of an history in G knowing (σC , σ−C) is the same as the
probability in MDP(G, σC , w) knowing σ−C . We do this by induction. This is
obvious for a history h of length 1. We now assume that the probability p(h)
of some history h is the same in G knowing (σC , σ−C) and in MDP(G, σC , w)
knowing σ−C . Let s be a state, the probability of h ·s in G knowing (σC , σ−C) is:
p(h) ·
∑
aAgt|δ(last(h),aAgt)=s
∏
A∈Agt σA(aA | h). This can be rewritten as: p(h) ·∑
aAgt|δ(last(h),aAgt)=s
π(σ−C)(a−C | h)
∏
A∈C σA(aA | h) which is equal to the
probability of h·s in MDP(G, σC , w) knowing σ−C . This shows that the expectation
for w of profile (σC , σ−C) in the game G is the same as the expected payoff for
A of the strategy π(σ−C) in the MDP(G, σC , w).
Theorem 11. Let σAgt be a stationary strategy profile, C a coalition, s a state
and w a weight function. The highest expectation Agt \C can obtain for w in G
from s: supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPw, s), is the smallest γs component of a solution of
the system of inequation:
φ(γ, σC , w) :=
∧
a−C∈ActAgt\C
∧
s∈S γs ≥
∑
aC∈ActC
γδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C σA(aA | s)
∧
∧
a−C∈ActAgt\C
∧
s∈S γs ≥ w(s)−βs+
∑
aC∈ActC
(
βδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C σA(aA | s)
)
Proof. We proved in Lem. 12 that the expected payoff of a profile in G is the
same as the expected payoff of its projection in MDP(G, σC , w). Replacing the
transition relation in the equation of φ by its expression in MDP(G, σC , w), and r
by w, we obtain by Lem. 11 that the expected payoff of the profile is the minimal
solution of:∧
a−C∈Act−C
∧
s∈S
γs ≥
∑
s′∈S
∑
{aC |δ(s,aC ,a−C)=s′}
γs′ ·
∏
A∈C
σA(aA | s)
∧
∧
a−C∈Act−C
∧
s∈S
γs ≥ w(s)− βs +
∑
s′∈S
∑
{aC |δ(s,aC ,a−C)=s′}
(
βs′ ·
∏
A∈C
σA(aA | s)
)
We notice that
∑
s′∈S
∑
{aC |δ(s,aC ,a−C)=s′}
f(s, s′, aC) is the same as:
∑
aC∈ActC
f(s, δ(s, aC , a−C), aC),
and rewrite the equation:∧
a−C∈Act−C
∧
s∈S
γs ≥
∑
aC∈ActC
γδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C
σA(aA | s)
∧
∧
a−C∈Act−C
∧
s∈S
γs ≥ w(s) − βs +
∑
aC∈ActC
(
βδ(s,aC ,a−C) ·
∏
A∈C
σA(aA | s)
)
Therefore supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPw, s) equals the minimal γs that is part of a solu-
tion of this equation.
A.2 Proof of Thm. 4
Lemma 13. The strategy profile σAgt is C-resilient if, and only if, it satisfies
the formula:
ρ(C, σAgt) :=
∧
A∈C
∃γ, γ′. (ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) ∧ φ(γ
′, σ−C , wA) ∧ (γ
′ ≤ γ))
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Proof. ⇒ Assume σAgt is C-resilient, and let A ∈ C. Consider γ the payoff
of A in OutG(σAgt), and γ
′ the highest payoff C can obtain for A against σ−C :
γ′ = supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPwA , s). By Thm. 2, γ makes ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) hold, and by
Thm. 11, γ′ makes φ(γ′, σ−C , wA) hold. Now since σAgt is resilient, C cannot im-
prove the payoff ofA and therefore γ′ ≤ γ. Hence (ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) ∧ φ(γ
′, σ−C , wA) ∧ (γ
′ ≤ γ))
is satisfied by this choice of γ and γ′. As we can do the same for all A ∈ C,
ρ(C, σAgt) holds.
⇐ The requirement that ψ(γ, σAgt, wA) holds, ensures that the payoff for
A of σAgt is γ (see Thm. 2). The requirement φ(γ
′, σ−C , wA), ensures that the
maximal payoff for A that coalition C can obtain against σ−C is less than γ
′ (see
Thm. 11). Finally the requirement γ′ ≤ γ, ensures that γ′ and therefore the best
value C can obtain, is smaller than γ, hence the coalition C cannot improved
the payoff of A by deviating. This implies the resilience of σAgt.
Lemma 14. The strategy profile σAgt is C, r-immune if, and only if, it satisfies
equation:
ι(C, σAgt) :=
∧
A 6∈C
∃γ, γ′. (ψ(γ, σAgt, A) ∧ φ(γ
′, σ−C ,−wA) ∧ γ − r ≤ −γ
′)
Proof. ⇒ Assume σAgt is C, r-immune, and let A 6∈ C. Consider γ the payoff of
A in OutG(σAgt). By Thm. 2, ψ(γ, σAgt, A) holds. Consider also γ
′ the negation of
lowest payoff C can obtain for A against σ−C : γ
′ = − infσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPwA , s).
We use the fact that the optimal values for limit inferior and superior coincide
in MDPs (see for instance [16, Thm. 9.1.3] to get the following
− inf
σ−C
EσC ,σ−C (MPwA , s) = sup
σ−C
−EσC ,σ−C (MPwA , s)
= sup
σ−C
EσC ,σ−C (−MPwA , s)
= sup
σ−C
EσC ,σ−C

ρ 7→ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∑
1≤k≤n
−wA(ρk), s


= sup
σ−C
EσC ,σ−C (MP−wA , s) (consequence of [16])
By Thm. 11, γ′ makes φ(γ′, σ−C ,−wA) hold.
Now since σAgt is C, r-immune, the deviation of C cannot make the payoff
of A 6∈ C decrease by more than r. Therefore infσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPwA , s) ≥ γ − r
and −γ′ ≥ γ − r.
⇐ The requirement that ψ(γ, σAgt, A) holds, ensures that the payoff for
A of σAgt is γ (see Thm. 2). The requirement φ(γ
′, σ−C ,−wA), ensures that
γ′ ≥ supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MP−wA , s) (see Thm. 11). As we so in the proof of impli-
cation, supσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MP−wA , s) = − infσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPwA , s), thus −γ
′ ≤
infσ−C E
σC ,σ−C (MPwA , s). Therefore coalition C against σ−C cannot make the
payoff of A lower than −γ′, so with the additional constraint that γ − r ≤ −γ′,
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the payoff of A cannot be decreased by more than r by a deviation of C. This
implies the immunity of σAgt.
Theorem 12. There is a robust equilibria if, and only if, the following equation
is satisfiable:
∃τ ∈ RAgt×Stat×Act. µ(τ) ∧
∧
C⊆Agt||C|≤k
ρ(C, τ) ∧
∧
C⊆Agt||C|≤t
ι(C, τ)
Proof. The formula µ(τ) that for each A ∈ Agt the mapping s, a 7→ τA,s,a de-
scribed by τ corresponds to a stationary strategy (see Lem. 1). Formula ρ(C, τ),
says that for each coalition C of size smaller than k, the profile described by
τ is C-resilient (see Lem. 13), hence it is k-resilient. Finally ι(C, τ), says that
for each coalition C of size smaller than t, the profile described by τ is (C, r)-
immune (see Lem. 14), hence it is (t, r)-immune. This is therefore equivalent to
the (k, t, r)-robustness of the strategy profile described by τ .
B Appendix for Section 4
Lemma 15. (Lem. 2 in the body of the paper) Let ρ be a play, σAgt a strategy
profile and C ⊆ Agt a coalition. Coalition C contains Dev(ρ, σAgt) if, and only
if, there exists σ′C such that ρ ∈ OutG(ρ0, σ
′
C , σ−C).
Proof. ⇒ Let ρ be a play and C a coalition which contains Dev(ρ, σAgt). We
define σ′C to be such that for all i, σ
′
C(ρ≤i) = (movei(ρ))C . We have that for
all indices i, Dev(ρi+1, σAgt(movei(ρ))) ⊆ C. Therefore for all agents A 6∈ C,
σA(ρ≤i) = (movei(ρ))A. Then Tab(ρi, σ
′
C(ρ≤i), σ−C(ρ≤i)) = ρi+1. Hence ρ is the
outcome of the profile (σ−C , σ
′
C).
⇐ Let σAgt be a strategy profile, σ
′
C a strategy for coalition C, and ρ ∈
OutG(ρ0, σ−C , σ
′
C). We have for all indices i thatmovei(ρ) = (σ−C(ρ≤i), σ
′
C(ρ≤i)).
Therefore for all agentsA 6∈ C, (movei(ρ))A = σA(ρ≤i). Then Dev(movei(ρ), σAgt(ρ≤i)) ⊆
C. Hence Dev(ρ, σAgt) ⊆ C.
Lemma 16. (Lem. 3 in the body of the paper) Let G be a game and σAgt be a
strategy profile and σ∃ = κ(σAgt) the associated strategy in the deviator game.
1. If ρ ∈ OutD(G)(σ∃), then Dev(πOut(ρ), σAgt) = δ(ρ).
2. If ρ ∈ OutG and ρ
′ = ((ρi,Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt)) · (σAgt(ρ≤i),movei(ρ)))i∈N then
ρ′ ∈ OutD(G)(σ∃)
Proof (Proof of 1). We prove that for all i, Dev(πOut(ρ)≤i, σAgt) = πDev(ρ≤i),
which implies the property. The property holds for i = 0, since initially both
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sets are empty. Assume now that it holds for i ≥ 0.
Dev(πOut(ρ)≤i+1, σAgt)
= Dev(πOut(ρ)≤i, σAgt) ∪ Dev(σAgt(πOut(ρ)≤i), πAct(movei+1(ρ))) (by definition of deviators)
= πDev(ρ≤i) ∪ Dev(σAgt(πAct(ρ)≤i), πAct(movei+1(ρ))) (by induction hypothesis)
= πDev(ρ≤i) ∪ Dev(σ∃(ρ≤i), πAct(movei+1(ρ))) (by definition of σ∃)
= πDev(ρ≤i) ∪ Dev(movei+1(ρ)) (by assumption ρ ∈ OutD(G)(σ∃))
= πDev(ρ≤i+1) (by construction of D(G))
Which concludes the induction.
Proof (Proof of 2). The property is shown by induction. It holds for the initial
state. Assume it is true until index i, then
Tab′(ρ′i, σ∃(ρ
′
≤i),movei(ρ))
= Tab′((ρi,Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt)), σ∃(ρ
′
≤i),movei(ρ)) (by definition of ρ
′)
= (Tab(ρi,movei(ρ)),Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt) ∪ Dev(σ∃(ρ
′
≤i), ρi+1)) (by construction of Tab
′)
= (ρi+1,Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt) ∪ Dev(σ∃(ρ
′
≤i), ρi+1)) (since ρ is an outcome of the game)
= (ρi+1,Dev(ρ≤i, σAgt) ∪ Dev(σAgt(ρ≤i), ρi+1)) (by construction of σ∃)
= (ρi+1,Dev(ρ≤i+1, σAgt)) (by definition of deviators)
= ρ′i+1
This shows that ρ′ is an outcome of σ∃.
Lemma 17. Let C ⊆ Agt be a coalition, σAgt be a strategy profile, G ⊆ R and A
a player. We have that for all strategies σ′C for coalition C, payoffA(σ−C , σ
′
C) ∈ G
if, and only if, κ(σAgt) is winning in D(G) for objective Ω(C,A,G) = {ρ | δ(ρ) ⊆
C ⇒ payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ∈ G}.
Proof. ⇒ Let ρ be an outcome of σ∃ = κ(σAgt). By Lem. 3, we have that
δ(ρ) = Dev(πOut(ρ), σAgt). By Lem. 2, πOut(ρ) is the outcome of (σ−δ(ρ), σ
′
δ(ρ)) for
some σ′δ(ρ). If δ(ρ) ⊆ C, then payoffA(πOut(ρ)) = payoffA(σ−C , σC\δ(ρ), σ
′
δ(ρ)) =
payoffA(σ−C , σ
′′
C) where σ
′′
A = σ
′
A if A ∈ δ(ρ) and σA otherwise. By hypothesis,
this payoff belongs to G. This holds for all outcomes ρ of σ∃, thus σ∃ is a winning
strategy for Ω(C,A,G).
⇐ Assume σ∃ = κ(σAgt) is a winning strategy in D(G) for Ω(C,A,G). Let
σ′C be a strategy for C and ρ the outcome of (σ
′
C , σ−C). By Lem. 2, Dev(ρ, σAgt) ⊆
C. By Lem. 3, ρ′ = (ρj ,Dev(ρ≤j , σAgt))j∈N is an outcome of σ∃. We have that
δ(ρ′) = Dev(ρ, σAgt) ⊆ C. Since σ∃ is winning, ρ is such that payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ∈
G. Since payoffA(πStat(ρ
′)) = payoffA(ρ), this shows that for all strategies σ
′
C ,
payoffA(σ−C , σ
′
C) ∈ G
B.1 Proof of Thm. 6
The proof of the theorem relies on the two following lemmas. The first one
shows the correctness of the resilience objective. The second lemma shows the
correctness of the immunity objective, its proof follows the same ideas than the
first and can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 18. Let G be a concurrent game and σAgt a strategy profile in G. The
strategy profile σAgt is k-resilient if, and only if, strategy κ(σAgt) is winning in
D(G) for objective Re(k, p) where p = payoff(σAgt).
Proof. By Lem. 17, σAgt is k-resilient if, and only if, for each coalition C of
size smaller than k, and each player A in C, κ(σAgt) is winning for Ω(C,A, ] −
∞, payoffA(σAgt)]). We will thus in fact show that for each coalition C of size
smaller than k, and each player A in C, κ(σAgt) is winning for Ω(C,A, ] −
∞, payoffA(σAgt)]) if, and only if, κ(σAgt) is winning for Re(k, p).
⇒ Let ρ be an outcome of κ(σAgt).
– If |δ(ρ)| > k, then ρ is in Re(k, p) by definition.
– If |δ(ρ)| = k, then for all A ∈ δ(ρ), payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ∈] −∞, p(A)] because
κ(σAgt) is winning for Ω(δ(ρ), A, ] −∞, p(A)]). Therefore ρ is in Re(k, p).
– If |δ(ρ)| < k, then for all A ∈ Agt, C = δ(ρ)∪{A} is a coalition of size smaller
than k, and payoffA(πOut(ρ)) ∈] − ∞, p(A)] because κ(σAgt) is winning for
Ω(C,A, ] −∞, p(A)]). Therefore ρ is in Re(k, p).
This holds for all outcomes ρ of κ(σAgt) and shows that κ(σAgt) is winning for
Re(k, p).
⇐ We now show that κ(σAgt) is winning for Ω(C,A, ]−∞, p(A)]) for each
coalition C of size smaller or equal to k and player A in C. Let ρ be an outcome
of κ(σAgt). Let p be such that strategy κ(σAgt) is winning for Re(k, p). We have
ρ ∈ Re(k, p). We show that ρ belongs to Ω(C,A, ] −∞, p(A)]):
– If δ(ρ) 6⊆ C, then ρ ∈ Ω(C,A, ] −∞, p(A)]) by definition.
– If δ(ρ) ⊆ C and |δ(ρ)| = k, then Dev(ρ) = C. Since ρ ∈ Re(k, p), for all
A ∈ C, payoffA(ρ) ≤ p(A) and therefore payoffA(ρ) ∈] − ∞, p(A)]. Hence
ρ ∈ Ω(C,A, ]−∞, p(A)]).
– If δ(ρ) ⊆ C and |δ(ρ)| < k, then since ρ ∈ Re(k, p), for all A ∈ Agt,
payoffA(ρ) ≤ p(A). Therefore ρ ∈ Ω(C,A, ] −∞, p(A)]).
This holds for all outcomes ρ of κ(σAgt) and shows it is winning for Ω(C,A, ] −
∞, p(A)]) for each coalition C and player A in C, which shows that σAgt is
k-resilient.
Lemma 19. Let G be a concurrent game and σAgt a strategy profile in G. The
strategy profile σAgt is (t, r)-immune if, and only if, strategy κ(σAgt) is winning
for objective I(t, r, p) where p = payoff(σAgt).
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Proof. By Lem. 17, σAgt is (t, r)-immune if, and only if, for each coalition C
of size smaller than t, and each player A not in C, κ(σAgt) is winning for
Ω(C,A, [payoffA(σAgt) − r,+∞[). We will thus in fact show that for each coali-
tion C of size smaller than t, and each player A not in C, κ(σAgt) is winning for
Ω(C,A, [payoffA(σAgt)− r,+∞[) if, and only if, κ(σAgt) is winning for Re(t, r, p).
⇒ Let ρ be an outcome of κ(σAgt).
– If |δ(ρ)| > t, then ρ is in I(t, r, p) by definition.
– If |δ(ρ)| ≤ t, then C = δ(ρ) is a coalition of size smaller than t. As a
consequence, for all A 6∈ δ(ρ), ρ is winning for Ω(C,A, [pA − r,+∞[). By
definition of Ω, we have payoffA(ρ) ≥ pA − r. Thus ρ is in I(t, r, p).
⇐ We now show that κ(σAgt) is winning for Ω(C,A, [payoffA(σAgt)−r,+∞[)
for each coalition C of size smaller than t and player A not in C. Let ρ be an
outcome of κ(σAgt). Let p be such that strategy κ(σAgt) is winning for I(t, r, p).
We have ρ ∈ I(t, r, p). We show that ρ belongs to Ω(C,A, [p(A) − r,+∞[):
– If δ(ρ) 6⊆ C, then ρ ∈ Ω(C,A, [p(A) − r,+∞[) by definition.
– If δ(ρ) ⊆ C, then since ρ ∈ I(t, r, p), for allA 6∈ C, p(A)−r ≤ payoffA(πOut(ρ)).
Therefore payoffA(ρ) ∈ [p(A)− r,+∞[ and ρ ∈ Ω(C,A, [p(A) − r,+∞[).
This holds for all outcomes ρ of κ(σAgt) and shows it is winning forΩ(C,A, [p(A)−
r,+∞[) for each coalition C and player A in C, which shows that σAgt is (t, r)-
immune.
Lemma 20. Let G be a concurrent game and σAgt a strategy profile in G. The
strategy profile σAgt is a (k, t, r)-robust profile in G if, and only if, the associated
strategy of Eve is winning for the objective R(k, t, r,Out(σAgt)) = Re(k, p) ∩
I(t, r, p) where p = payoff(σAgt).
Proof. This is a simple consequence of Lem. 18 and Lem. 19. Let σAgt be a
(k, t, r)-robust strategy profile. It is k-resilient, so κ(σAgt) is winning the re-
silience objective. It is also (t, r)-immune, so κ(σAgt) is winning the immunity
objective. Therefore any outcome of σAgt is in the intersection, and σAgt ensures
the robustness objective.
In the other direction, assume κ(σAgt) wins the robustness objective. Then
σAgt wins both the k-resilience objective and the (t, r)-immunity objective. Using
lemmas 18 and 19, σAgt is k-resilient and (t, r)-immune; it is therefore (k, t, r)-
robust.
C Appendix for Section 5
C.1 Proof of Lem. 5
Lemma 21. Let ρ be a play. It satisfies objective δ(ρ) = ∅⇒ MPAi(ρ) = pi if,
and only if, MP2·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ p(Ai) and MP3·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
Proof. We distinguish two cases according to whether δ(ρ) is empty.
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– If δ(ρ) 6= ∅, the implication holds and we have that after some point in the
execution πDev(ρ) 6= ∅. By item 7 of the definition of v, the average weight
on dimensions 2 · |Agt|+ i and 3 · |Agt|+ i will tend to W , which is greater
than p(Ai) and −p(Ai). Therefore the equivalence holds.
– If δ(ρ) = ∅, then along all the run the D component is empty. By item 6 of
the definition of v,MPv2·|Agt|+i(ρ) = MPwAi (ρ) andMPv3·|Agt|+i(ρ) = −MPwAi (ρ).
Therefore MPAi(ρ) = pi is equivalent to the fact MP2·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ p(Ai) and
MP3·v|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
Lemma 22. If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt) with payoff(σAgt) = p, then play ρ sat-
isfies objective Re(k, p) if, and only if, for all agents Ai, MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
Proof. First notice the following equivalence:
payoffAi(ρ) ≤ p(Ai)⇔ lim inf
wi(ρ≤n)
n
≤ p(Ai)⇔ lim sup−
wi(ρ≤n)
n
≥ −p(Ai)
⇒ Let Ai be a player, and assume ρ ∈ Re(k, p). We distinguish three cases
based on the size of δ(ρ):
– If |δ(ρ)| < k then for all indices j, |Dev(ρ≤j′ )| < k . Therefore v|Agt|+i(ρj) =
−wAi(ρj) (item 3 of the definition). Then as ρ is in Re(k, p), payoffAi(ρ) ≤
p(Ai) and therefore MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai)
– If |δ(ρ)| = k, then we distinguish two cases:
• If Ai 6∈ δ(ρ), then there is a j such that for all j
′ ≥ j, |Dev(ρ≤j)| = k and
Ai 6∈ Dev(ρj). Therefore for all j
′ ≥ j we have that v|Agt|+i(ρj′ ) = W
(item 5 of the definition). Since p(Ai) ≥ −W , MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
• Otherwise Ai ∈ δ(ρ), then there is a j such that for all j
′ ≥ j, Ai ∈
Dev(ρ≤j′). Therefore for all j
′ ≥ j we have that v|Agt|+i(ρj′ ) = −wAi(ρj′ )
(item 4 of the definition). Then MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) = lim sup−
wi(ρ≤n)
n
. Then
as ρ satisfies Re(k, p) payoffAi(ρ) ≤ p(Ai) and therefore using the equiv-
alence at the beginning of this proof MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
– Otherwise |δ(ρ)| > k. Then, there is some index j such that either |Dev(ρ≤j)| >
k or |Dev(ρ≤j)| = k ∧A 6∈ Dev(ρ≤j). Then, by monotonicity of Dev along ρ,
for all j′ ≥ j, v|Agt|+i(ρj′) =W (item 5 of the definition). Since p(Ai) ≥ −W ,
MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
⇐ Now assume that for all players Ai, MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
– If |δ(ρ)| < k, therefore for all i and j we have that v|Agt|+i(ρj) = −wAi(ρj)
then MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) = lim sup−
wi(ρ≤n)
n
. Thus using the equivalence at the
beginning of this proof payoffAi(ρ) ≤ p(Ai) for all Ai.
– If |δ(ρ)| = k. Let Ai be a player in δ(ρ). Then for all j, either |Dev(ρ≤j)| < k
or Ai ∈ Dev(ρ≤j). Therefore for all j we have that v|Agt|+i(ρj) = −wAi(ρj)
then MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) = lim sup−
wi(ρ≤n)
n
. Thus using the equivalence at the
beginning of this proof payoffAi(ρ) ≤ p(Ai). This being true for all players
in δ(ρ) shows that ρ belongs to Re(k, p).
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– Otherwise |δ(ρ)| > k and then ρ ∈ Re(k, p) by definition of Re(k, p).
We now show the immunity part.
Lemma 23. If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt) with payoff(σAgt) = p, then play ρ
satisfies objective I(t, r, p) if, and only if, for all agents Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai)−r.
Proof. ⇒ Let Ai be a player and assume ρ ∈ I(t, r, p). We distinguish two
cases:
– If |δ(ρ)| ≤ t ∧ Ai 6∈ δ(ρ), then for all indices j, vi(ρj) = wAi(ρj). There-
fore MPvi(ρ) = payoffAi(πStat(ρ)). Then as ρ satisfies I(t, r, p), p(Ai) − r ≤
payoffAi(πStat(ρ)) = MPvi(ρ).
– Otherwise there is some index j such that either |Dev(ρ≤j)| > t or A ∈
Dev(ρ≤j). Then, by monotonicity of Dev along ρ, for all j
′ ≥ j, vi(ρj′) =
W ≥ p(Ai). Hence MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai).
⇐ Assume that for all players Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai)− r.
– If |δ(ρ)| ≤ t. Let Ai 6∈ δ(ρ), then for all j, |Dev(ρ≤j)| ≤ t and A 6∈ Dev(ρ≤j).
Therefore for all j we have that vi(ρj) = wAi(ρj) and thus MPvi(ρ) ≥
p(Ai) − r ⇔ payoffAi(ρ) − r ≤ payoffAi(ρ). This shows that ρ belongs to
I(t, r, p).
– Otherwise δ(ρ)| > t and ρ belongs to I(t, r, p) by definition of I(t, r, p).
We now join the two preceding result to talk about the robustness objective.
Lemma 24. If ρ is an outcome of κ(σAgt) with payoff(σAgt) = p, then play
ρ satisfies objective R(k, t, r, p) if, and only if, for all agents Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥
p(Ai)− r and MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai).
Proof.
ρ ∈ R(k, t, r, p)⇔ρ satisfies Re(k, p) and I(t, r, p) (By definition of R(k, t, r, p))
⇔ρ ∈ Re(k, p) and ∀Ai ∈ Agt. MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai)− r (By Lem. 23)
⇔∀Ai ∈ Agt. MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai)
and ∀Ai ∈ Agt. MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai)− r (By Lem. 22)
Lemma 25. (Lem. 6 in the body of the paper) Let G be a concurrent game with
mean-payoff objectives. There is a (k, t, r)-robust equilibrium in G if, and only
if, for the multidimensional mean-payoff objective given by v, I = J1, |Agt|K ∪
J2 · |Agt| + 1, 3 · |Agt|K and J = J|Agt| + 1, 2 · |Agt|K ∪ J3 · |Agt| + 1, 4 · |Agt|K,
there is a payoff vector p such that Eve can ensure threshold u in D(G), where
for all i ∈ J1, |Agt|K, ui = p(Ai) − r, u|Agt|+i = −p(Ai), u2·|Agt|+i = p(Ai), and
u3·|Agt|+i = −p(Ai).
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Proof. ⇒ Let σAgt be a robust equilibrium, using Thm. 6 κ(σAgt) is a strategy
of Eve in D(G) which ensures R(k, t, r, p) where p = payoff(Out(σAgt)). Let ρ be
an outcome of κ(σAgt) in D(G). We will show that it is above the threshold u in
all dimensions.
We first show that δ(ρ) = ∅ =⇒ MPAi(ρ) = pi. If δ(ρ) 6= ∅ this is trivial.
Otherwise δ(ρ) = ∅, and by Lem. 3, there is ρ′ such that Dev(ρ′, σAgt) = ∅ and
ρ = πOut(ρ
′). Then by Lem. 2, ρ′ = OutG(σAgt). Therefore ρ = πOut(OutG(σAgt)),
thus MPAi(ρ) = payoffi(σAgt) = pi and the implication holds.
Then by Lem. 21, we have that MPv2·|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ p(Ai) and MPv3·|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥
−p(Ai). This shows we ensure the correct thresholds on dimensions in J2 · |Agt|+
1, 4 · |Agt|K. Now, by Lem. 24, for all agents Ai, MPvi(ρ) ≥ p(Ai) − r and
MPv|Agt|+i(ρ) ≥ −p(Ai). This shows we ensure the correct thresholds on dimen-
sions in J1, 2 · |Agt|K.
⇐ In the other direction, let p be a payoff vector such that there exist a
strategy σ∃ in D(G) that ensure the threshold u. We define a strategy profile σAgt
by induction, given a history h in G: 1. if |h| = 1, then h′ = (h0,∅); 2. otherwise
we assume σAgt has already been defined for histories shorter than h, we let h
′ =
(h0,∅)·(σAgt(h≤0),move0(h))·((hi,Dev(h≤i, σAgt)) · (σAgt(h≤i),movei(h)))0<i<|h|−1·
(h,Dev(h, σAgt)). Note the similarity with the second point of Lem. 3 and the
fact that πOut(h
′) = h. We then set σAgt(h) = σ∃(h
′).
We show that payoff(Out(σAgt)) = p. Consider the strategy σ∀ of Adam in
D(G) that always plays the same move as Eve, the outcome ρ = OutD(G)(σ∃, σ∀)
is such that δ(ρ) = ∅. Since σ∃ ensures the threshold u, using Lem. 21, for
all agents Ai, MPAi(ρ) = p(Ai). We now show by induction that πOut(ρ) is
compatible with σAgt. Let i ∈ N, we assume that the property holds for prefixes
of πOut(ρ) of length less than i. We have that πAct(ρi) = σAgt(πOut(ρ)≤i)) because
Adam plays the same move than Eve on this path. We also have that πStat(ρi+1) =
Tab(πStat(ρi), πAct(ρi)) = Tab(πStat(ρi), σAgt(πOut(ρ)≤i)) by construction ofD(G),
and therefore πOut(ρi+1) is compatible with σAgt. Then as ρ is the projection of
the outcome of σAgt, we have that payoff(Out(σAgt)) = p.
Let ρ be an outcome of σ∃. By Lem. 23, we have that ρ satisfies the objective
I(t, r, p), and by Lem. 22 it satisfies Re(k, p). Using Thm. 6, strategy σAgt is an
equilibrium in G with the payoff p.
Proof. If we apply the bound of [8, Thm. 22], to the deviator game, then this
shows that if there is a solution there is one of size bounded by d·P1(max{||ai, bi|| |
1 ≤ i ≤ k}, P6(||W ||, ||Stat × 2
Agt||, d), d) where ||x|| represents the size of the
encoding of the object x, P1 and P6 are two polynomial functions, (ai, bi)1≤i≤k
are the inequations defining the polyhedron, W is the maximal constant occur-
ring in the weights and d is the number of dimension, which in our case is equal
to 4 · |Agt|. The size ||Stat×2Agt|| is bounded by ||Stat||+ |Agt| (using one bit for
each agent in our encoding). Thus the global bound is polynomial with respect
to the game G.
Lemma 26. (Lem. 7 in the body of the paper) If there is a solution to the poly-
hedron value problem in D(G) then there is one whose encoding is of polynomial
size with respect to G and the polyhedron given as input.
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D Appendix for Section 6
Lemma 27. (Lem. 8 in the body of the paper) Eve can ensure payoff u ∈
J−W,W Kd in D(G) from (s,D) if, and only if, she can ensure u in the fixed
coalition game F(D, p) from (s,D).
Proof. ⇒ Let σ∃ be strategy which ensures u in D(G) from (s,D). If we apply
the strategy in F , any of its outcome ρ from (s,D) will either stay in the D
component and correspond to an outcome of σ∃ in D(G) or reach a state (s
′, D′)
in Succ(D). Since Eve can ensure the payoff u in D(G), and (s′, D′) is reached
by one of its outcome, she can do so from (s′, D′). Therefore (s′, D′) is a state
where the weights are maximal (equal to W on all dimensions) and the outcome
is winning in F(D, u).
⇐ Let σ∃ be strategy that ensures u in F(D, p). Every outcome of this
strategy that get out of the D component, reach a state (s′, D′) ∈ Succ(D)
where the weights are greater than u. These states cannot be losing since the
weights on any dimension i would be smaller than −W − 1, which is smaller
than ui. This means that these states are winning, and to each state (s
′, D′)
with D′ 6= D that is reached by an outcome of σ∃ we can associate a strategy
σ
s′,D′
Eve that is winning from (s
′, D′). We consider the strategy σ′∃ that plays
according to σ∃ as long has we stay in the D component and according to σ
s′,D′
Eve
once we reach another component, where (s′, D′) is the first state outside the D
component that was reached.
The construction is such that the strategy σ′∃ ensures u in D(G): let ρ be one
of its outcome, if ρ stays in the D component, it is also an outcome of σ∃ with
the same payoff which is above u; otherwise ρ reaches a state (s′, D′) in Succ(D)
and from this point Eve follows a strategy that ensures threshold u.
E Appendix for Section 7
Theorem 13. The robustness problem is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Note first that if the outcome is going to the state winning for Adam,
it is possible for a Ai to change its strategy and go to ⊥, thus improving its
payoff. Therefore a (n + 1)-resilient equilibrium is necessarily losing for Adam
and winning for all the others.
Validity ⇒ equilibrium. Assume that φ is valid, we will show that there is
a (n+1)-resilient equilibrium. We define a strategy of Eve such that if vh makes
∃xm. ∀xm+1 · · · ∃xn. C1∧· · ·∧Ck valid, then σ∃(h) = Xm such that vh·Xm makes
∀xm+1 · · · ∃xn. C1∧· · ·∧Ck valid. As φ is valid, we know that for all outcomes h
of σ∃ of the form Adam1 ·X1 · · · Evek ·Xk, vh makes C1∧· · ·∧Ck valid. Then from
Xm, Eve can choose for each close a state Y that is different from all X1 . . . Xm.
We also fix the strategy of all players Ai and Bi and Adam to go to the state ⊥.
This defines a strategy profile that we will write σAgt.
Consider a strategy profile σ′Agt where at most (n+1) strategies are different
from the ones in σAgt. Assume σ
′
Agt reaches Evem. We know that in σ
′
Agt at
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least n + 1 strategies are different from the ones σAgt and {A ∈ Agt | σ
′
A 6=
σA} = {Adam, X1, . . . , Xm}. Then, by the choice of the strategy for Eve, the
states that are seen in the following are controlled by players that are different
from X1, . . . , Xm. Thus the run ends in ⊥.
Equilibrium =⇒ validity. Assume that σ∃ is part of a (n+1)-resilient equi-
librium, we will show that φ is valid. Given a partial valuation vm : {x1, . . . , xm} 7→
{true, false}, we define the function f(vm) such that:
f(vm)⇔ σ∃(Adam1 ·X1 · · ·Adamm ·Xm) = Bm+1.
We will show that every valuation v, such that v(x2k) = f(v|2k−1), makes the
formula C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ck valid, which shows that the formula φ is valid.
For all such valuations v, we can define strategies of Adam and players Xi
such that Xi = Ai if v(xi) = false and Xi = Bi otherwise, such that keeping all
other strategies similar to σAgt, the state Evem is reached. Then, if we see a state
belonging to one of the Xi, we can make the strategy go to the ⊤ state. Since
the profile is (n+ 1)-resilient, this is impossible. Which shows that σEve chooses
for each clause a literal such that v(ℓ) = true. Therefore v makes the formula
C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ck valid.
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